



**Changes to the Migration Error  
Handling and Retry Strategy to include  
the MOC (Secure) Cohort - Consultation  
Document**

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# 1. Introduction and Context

A number of energy suppliers have installed first generation smart devices (known as SMETS1 devices) in consumers' premises across Great Britain. The Data Communications Company (DCC) has designed a solution for the enrolment of SMETS1 devices into its network. Part of DCC's plan to deliver SMETS1 services involves a detailed approach for migrating SMETS1 Installations into DCC's systems. The detailed technical and procedural requirements of this approach are set out in the SMETS1 Transition and Migration Approach Document (TMAD). The current TMAD (which covers requirements for the initial operating capability (known as 'IOC') for SMETS1 Services) was designated by the Secretary of State on 28 July 2019 and included in the Smart Energy Code (SEC) from version 6.14 onwards as Appendix AL of the SEC.

Clauses 8.8 to 8.10 of the TMAD covers the arrangements for initial development and subsequent change of the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy (MEHRS). The recently baselined version of MEHRS<sup>1</sup> covers the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and changes to include the Middle Operating Capability (MOD – MDS) were concluded<sup>2</sup> upon on by the DCC on 3 June 2020 following a consultation with Industry.

Subsequently, there are further changes to MEHRS that are required to expand the content to cover for the Middle Operating Capability (MOC - Secure) and Final Operating Capability (FOC).

The changes made to MEHRS within the scope of this consultation are against the published conclusion version for MOC (MDS). These amendments cover instances where the MOC (Secure) cohort has specific error/retry resolution scenarios that vary from the IOC and MOC (MDS) cohorts due to differences between Installation types.

Specific changes are listed in Section 2 of this document. Some minor administrative changes have also been made to MEHRS that provide additional clarity on the drafting and apply generally to all cohorts as indicated in Section 2.

This consultation document is seeking views on the detailed amendments to the MEHRS.

## 2. Changes to the MEHRS

This version of MEHRS has a number of changes in the main body of the document when compared to the MOC (MDS) conclusion version.

There are a few minor drafting changes within the legal drafting to amend for typographical errors and improve clarity. The key proposed changes to the MEHRS are set out in Table 1 - Overview of Drafting Changes.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/document-centre/tmad-child-documents/migration-error-handling-and-retry-strategy-mehrs/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/customer-hub/consultations/dcc-responses/dcc-conclusions-on-updates-to-the-migration-error-handling-and-retry-strategy-for-moc-mds/>

No	MEHRS Reference	Description and Rationale for Change
1.	2.3.2	Amended context of MA001 and MA002 validation checks to match the production functionality. This update aligns MEHRS and current solution.
2.	2.6.6	Inclusion of DSP as a potential acting party that could be required to resolve an incident if there is a failure to update the CHF on SMI. This update aligns MEHRS and current solution.
3.	2.6.7	Updated to clarify that upon resolution of the incident, the S1SP will generate the S1SP Commissioning File. This update aligns MEHRS and current solution.
4.	3.1	IOC S1SP Retry process – updated the long retry interval from 2 hours to 30 minutes and total period from 24 hours to 48 hours. This update aligns MEHRS and current solution.
5.	A.1	Introduced a new error code MA122 to report Installations that have failed at commissioning steps as a failure in MRR6. This is a new update to the solution which will be introduced imminently.
6.	2.3.2	New error codes have been introduced to cater for Secure’s detailed design and process checks.
7.	2.4.1.1	New section introduced to cover installation level pre-MCF generation checks for GroupID ‘DA’
8.	2.4.4 2.4.5	Updated the text to differentiate between the processing S1SP and the Migration Common Validation Function of the IOC S1SP
9.	2.5.1.1	New section introduced to cover pre-account switch checks for GroupID ‘DA’
10.	2.5.2	Updated for SMETS1 Installations belonging to GroupID ‘DA’, where SMETS1 SMSO is unable to transfer account control from SMSO to DCC Total System within a time duration such that it results in the S1SP not receiving the S1SP Required File Set for those SMETS1 Installations within 24 hours of the MVF being generated, those Installations will be report as a failure
11.	2.5.4 2.5.5 2.5.6	Omitted references to generation of MGF file for SMETS1 Installations that belong to GroupID ‘DA’ as the functionality does not apply for these Installations.

No	MEHRS Reference	Description and Rationale for Change
12.	2.5.5 2.5.7 2.5.8 2.5.10	Updated error handling instruction for Installations belonging to GroupID 'DA' that have failed at a process step after account has been switched from SMSO to DCC but prior to the SUA key has rotated - the S1SP is required to switch back the account from DCC to SMSO so that the affected SMETS1 Installations can be resubmitted for migrations.
13.	2.5.9	Omitted reference to this section for SMETS1 Installations that belong to GroupID 'DA' as the clause 5.23 do not apply for these Installations.
14.	2.6.2 2.6.3	Omitted reference to these sections for SMETS1 Installations that belong to GroupID 'DA' as the checks are carried out in advance as outlined in the new MEHRS Section 2.4.1.1
15.	2.6.4.1	New section introduced to cover error handling scenarios during SUA key rotation for SMETS1 Installations belonging to GroupID 'DA'
16.	2.6.5	Omitted reference to this section for SMETS1 Installations that belong to GroupID 'DA' as rollback scenarios for this group is outlined in the new MEHRS section 2.6.4.1
17.	3.3	New section to outline the Retry strategy of SMETS1 Installation for GroupID 'DA' for SUA Key Rotation

**Table 1 - Overview of Drafting Changes**

<b>MEHRS for MOC (Secure) Q1</b>	Do you have any comments on changes to the MEHRS for MOC (Secure) within the scope of this consultation?
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### 3. Next Steps

Following the closure of this consultation, DCC will consider respondents' views consistent with the requirement to engage with stakeholders as per Clause 8.8 of the TMAD and then conclude on the draft MEHRS document.

Consistent with the provisions of Clause 8.9 of the TMAD, following publication of the draft MEHRS document, there is a 14 day appeal window that permits any Supplier Party to appeal the draft MEHRS to the Secretary of State for a decision. Following the outcome of the process the updated MEHRS will be final and published on the DCC website.

### 4. How to Respond

Please provide responses in the attached template by 1600 on 3 July 2020 to DCC at [consultations@smartdcc.co.uk](mailto:consultations@smartdcc.co.uk).

Consultation responses may be published on our website [www.smartdcc.co.uk](http://www.smartdcc.co.uk). Please state clearly in writing whether you want all or any part, of your consultation to be treated as

confidential. It would be helpful if you could explain to us why you regard the information you have provided as confidential. Please note that responses in their entirety (including any text marked confidential) may be made available to the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (the Authority). Information provided to BEIS or the Authority, including personal information, may be subject to publication or disclosure in accordance with the access to information legislation (primarily the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004). If BEIS or the Authority receive a request for disclosure of the information we/they will take full account of your explanation (to the extent provided to them), but we/they cannot give an assurance that confidentiality can be maintained in all circumstances. An automatic confidentiality disclaimer generated by your IT system will not, of itself, be regarded by us as a confidentiality request.

If you have any questions about the consultation documents, please contact DCC via [consultations@smartdcc.co.uk](mailto:consultations@smartdcc.co.uk).

## **5. Attachments**

- Attachment 1 - Migration Error Handling and Retry Document v2.1 (clean version)
- Attachment 2 - Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy v2.1 (change marked against V2.0 MOC -MDS version)
- Attachment 3 - Response Template