



**Updates to the Migration Error
Handling and Retry Strategy for MOC
(Secure) - Conclusions Document**

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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----------|
| 1. Introduction and Context | 3 |
| 2. Stakeholder Engagement..... | 3 |
| 3. Consultation Questions & Respondents..... | 4 |
| 4. Analysis of Responses..... | 4 |
| 4.1. Migration Authorisation File Error | 4 |
| 4.1.1. Respondent View..... | 4 |
| 4.1.2. DCC's Response | 4 |
| 4.2. Additional Migration Error Reason Codes..... | 5 |
| 4.2.1. Respondent View..... | 5 |
| 4.2.2. DCC's response | 5 |
| 4.3. Differences in IOC error codes and Secure error codes..... | 5 |
| 4.3.1. Respondent View..... | 5 |
| 4.3.2. DCC's response | 5 |
| 4.4. Regeneration of the Migration Common File | 6 |
| 4.4.1. Respondent View..... | 6 |
| 4.4.2. DCC's response | 6 |
| 4.5. Device Connectivity Retry and Timeout Strategy..... | 6 |
| 4.5.1. Respondent View..... | 6 |
| 4.5.2. DCC's response | 6 |
| 5. Summary of Drafting Changes | 6 |
| 6. Conclusion and Next Steps | 6 |
| 7. Attachments | 7 |

1. Introduction and Context

The detailed technical and procedural requirements of this approach are set out in the Transition and Migration Approach Document (TMAD).

On 14 February 2019, BEIS designated TMAD into the Smart Energy Code (SEC) using the powers that are set out in Section X of the SEC. TMAD requires that DCC develop and consult on four 'child' documents (which provide further operational and technical details) as follows:

- Migration Scaling Methodology;
- Migration Authorisation Mechanism;
- Migration Reporting Regime; and
- Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy.

The DCC published the latest version of the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy on 3 June 2020 covering IOC and MOC (MDS) which is available on the DCC website¹.

On 5 June, DCC issued a consultation² that sought views on a few changes to the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy to reflect the migration solution changes identified for the MOC (Secure) capability release for which the consultation closed on 3 July 2020.

This document considers responses of the consultation and summarises corresponding changes published in version 3.0 of the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy.

2. Stakeholder Engagement

This section details the DCC's stakeholder engagement that has taken place in relation to revision of the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy.

On 5 June 2020, DCC published the consultation document titled 'Changes to the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy to include the MOC (Secure Cohort Consultation) Document' on the DCC Website and DCC's Service Desk also emailed stakeholders to notify them of its publication.

The scope of the consultation covered the following matters:

- [Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy v2.1 \(clean\)](#)

Stakeholders were invited to respond by 16:00 on 3 July 2020 using a response template that was provided as part of the consultation.

¹ <https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/document-centre/tmad-child-documents>

² <https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/customer-hub/consultations/dcc-consultation-on-updates-to-the-migration-error-handling-and-retry-strategy-for-moc-secure/>

3. Consultation Questions & Respondents

The SMETS1 MEHRS Response Template presented the following questions covering the consultation as presented in Table 1.

| Number | Consultation Question |
|---------------------------|--|
| MEHRS for MOC (Secure) Q1 | Do you have any general comments on the changes to the MEHRS for MOC (Secure) within the scope of this consultation? |

Table 1 – Consultation Questions

During the consultation period, DCC received three responses to the consultation providing feedback on changes recommended in the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy (MEHRS). Questions raised through the MEHRS consultation that extended functionality or solution design outside the error handling have been responded separately through bilateral engagement with the respondents and where appropriate, will be added FAQ on the MOC Secure solution. There were no concerns raised by the stakeholders regarding the changes recommended by DCC in the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy document.

4. Analysis of Responses

DCC has analysed the feedback provided by each respondent. Subject matter experts within DCC have reviewed each response and structured the analysis by subject.

Thus, this section presents DCC’s analysis of questions grouped by context; with each sub-section structured as:

- an overview of the responses on the topic; and
- DCC’s response

4.1. Migration Authorisation File Error

4.1.1. Respondent View

One of the respondents identified a potential inconsistency in referencing tables in the document Appendix.

4.1.2. DCC’s Response

The GroupID references for error codes in Appendix A.1. refer to Additional Reason Codes and have not need to align to the references in Section 2.3.2.

4.2. Additional Migration Error Reason Codes

4.2.1. Respondent View

A respondent queried the potential inclusion of additional SMSO error codes relevant to pre migration checks in the Secure preparation for migration.

4.2.2. DCC's Response

The error codes listed in the MEHRS are reported via the MRR reports received by the Responsible Supplier. The DCC notes that any error codes used outside the migration process as defined in the TMAD will not be included in the MEHRS but may be received by Responsible Suppliers through separate arrangements with the Secure SMSO.

4.3. Differences in IOC error codes and Secure error codes

4.3.1. Respondent View

One respondent requested that DCC clarify the use of error codes between IOC and MOC cohorts that appear to respond the same error circumstance.

4.3.2. DCC's Response

The DCC notes that there are a number of error codes used in the IOC definitions, for which there is an apparent conflict with the MOC Secure error code numbering. The difference in the error codes is due to the check for the error conditions being undertaken at two separate time points in the MOC Secure migration process. This relates to:

- MA007 appears to duplicate MA104 (All GroupIDs). The DCC notes that the MA007 refers to an initial MA rejection of an ESME. The MA104 indicates a change of supplier against the ESME, therefore error codes are not duplicated.
- MA008 appears to duplicate MA105 (All GroupIDs). The DCC notes that the MA008 refers to an initial MA rejection of an GSME. The MA105 indicates a change of supplier against the GSME, therefore error codes are not duplicated.
- MA017 appears to duplicate MA117 (GroupID =AA, BA, CB). The error codes and their descriptions are identical and refer to their checks taking place at a different time in the process. The MA017 references a device being blocked and detected during MA validation and the MA117 indicates a device has been blocked post MA validation.
- MA111 appears to duplicate MA521 (GroupID =DA), it is noted that the MA111 is a non event related device configuration check as per conditions in the S1SR. This takes place in pre migration configuration checks for MOC Secure. MA521 relates to mandated and non-mandated event configurations as per conditions in the S1SR that takes place in the second pre migration configuration check in the MOC Secure migration process.
- MA112 versus MA523 (GroupID =DA). The MA112 identifies an error where there has been no WAN comms with the installation in the last 7 days. MA523 identifies an error

during the pre migration configuration checks where the device is not contactable over the WAN.

Table A.1 of the MEHRS has been updated to provide more detail on the error codes taken at the second point in time during the MOC Secure migration checks.

4.4. Regeneration of the Migration Common File

4.4.1. Respondent View

One respondent in their consultation response identified a potential discrepancy in the document where the red-lined text for "GroupID DA" does not include the statement "*...the Requesting Party will resubmit the affected SMETS1 Installations in a new Migration Common File...*". It is expected that while taking steps to reconfigure the affected SMETS1 Installations it is unclear why the new Migration Common File is not automatically generated by the Requesting Party.

4.4.2. DCC's Response

DCC acknowledges this feedback, the MEHRS has been updated. This update will be reflected in a maintenance release expected in early August.

4.5. Device Connectivity Retry and Timeout Strategy

4.5.1. Respondent View

One respondent in their consultation response identified a discrepancy in the MEHRS document that states "...After 24 hours of retries...", even though the newly introduced red-lined changes refer to retries "...for a period up to 48 hours...".

4.5.2. DCC's Response

The DCC agrees with this feedback and has now updated the MEHRS to correctly identify a period of up to 48 hours as expected.

5. Summary of Drafting Changes

Table A.1 in the Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy document has been updated with additional descriptive information on code errors that appear to duplicate existing codes for clarification as a result of the consultation feedback.

Section 3.1 Device Connectivity Retry and Timeout Strategy has been updated in line with consultation feedback.

6. Conclusion and Next Steps

In accordance with Clause 8.8 of the SEC Appendix AL, the Transition and Migration Approach Document (TMAD), DCC will publish the updated MEHRS along with the documents that have been published pursuant to that Section.

In terms of Clause 8.9 of TMAD, within 14 days of the publication of the MEHRS, any Supplier Party may refer the MEHRS to the Secretary of State, which should be sent to the following email address: smets1_appeals@beis.gov.uk.

7. Attachments

- Attachment 1 – Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy v3.0
- Attachment 2 – Migration Error Handling and Retry Strategy v3.0 (delta vs published version v2.0)